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The mathematical continuum: A haunting problematic
Elizabeth de Freitas1
Manchester Metropolitan University, United Kingdom
ABSTRACT: The mathematical continuum has a number of formulations and technical
definitions. Two of these reference the geometric line and the real number system. This
conceptual coupling of line and number has been an enduring source for mathematical
invention and paradox. The continuum captures the monstrous desire of mathematics, a
desire to re-assemble the point with the line, the discrete with the continuous, the finite
with the infinite. This paper explores how the continuum is a source of fundamental
ambiguity fueling our desires and fears about mathematics.
Key words: continuum, paradox, number line, Real number system, desire

The haunting
In set theory, the mathematical continuum refers to the power set of the natural numbers,
but on a more intuitive plane, the continuum melds the geometric line with the real
number system. This conceptual coupling of line with number has been an enduring
source for mathematical invention and paradox. If the density of the real numbers – that
being the fact that you can always find another real number between any other two - is
not adequate to ensure that the reals are continuous and without gaps, then there seems to
be a haunting absence that destabilizes the continuum. Concerns that Euclid’s axioms
could not, in principle, construct the continuity of the number line lead to various
attempts to do so in the nineteenth century. Dedekind (1831-1916), intent on banishing
all geometric “intuition” from mathematics, used classes and “cuts” to compose the
infinite granularity needed for the continuum. Each real number – each ‘part’ of the
continuum – was to be uniquely identified with a cut (Dedekind 1901). When the cut

1

L.de-freitas@mmu.ac.uk

The Mathematics Enthusiast, ISSN 1551-3440, vol. 15, nos. 1&2, pp. 148-158
2018 © The Author(s) & Dept. of Mathematical Sciences-The University of Montana

TME, vol. 15, nos. 1&2, p. 149

designated a rational number, rather than irrational, the number was then assigned to one
of the two sets on either side of the cut. But in the case of an irrational number, the
number belonged to neither. In such irrational cases, the number was always on the
outside of both sets, which made it strangely unreachable and yet adequately defined in
absentia. Irrational numbers were thus produced through this method, and thus the
continuum was adequately defined or constructed. And yet the irrationals were somehow
excluded as well, being outside either set, which for some mathematicians cast some
small measure of suspicion on Dedekind’s method.
Cantor (1845-1918) would offer a similar ‘compositional’ approach, proposing
necessary and sufficient conditions for continuity that relied on set theoretic constraints
(Ferreirós 1993). As set theory came to dominate the field in the nineteenth century, the
materiality of the number line was left behind, and the continuum became simply the
power set of the natural numbers. But haunting this historical development is the
unresolved continuum hypothesis. This famous hypothesis refers to the proposition that
there is no set of numbers with cardinality between that of the natural numbers (1, 2, 3,
…) and that of the real numbers. In other words, the hypothesis can be characterized by
the claim that the next biggest set, that cannot be counted by the natural numbers, is the
set of real numbers. The hypothesis predicts that there is no set of numbers with
cardinality between these two sets, which would mean that the set of Reals captured
everything between, and that they were continuous. If there is no other set, then there is
nothing missing from the Reals – there are no gaps haunting them, so to speak.
Over the centuries, the continuum seems to vibrate with traumatic desire, a desire
to be both discrete and continuous, counted and uncountable, separate but connected. The
mathematical continuum seems to function like a desiring machine, spurring
mathematical inventiveness and ever new axiomatic endeavors. This ongoing concern
with the continuum reveals the affective-material dimensions of mathematics. The
traumatic investment in cutting up the continuum shows how mathematics taps an animal
desire, a desire to fold continuously with the world, but also to cut oneself off as discrete
individual (de Freitas 2016b). The mathematical continuum encapsulates our collective
dilemma - we are all connected, but we are all individuals. The rumbling continuum
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captures the monstrous desire of mathematics, a desire to re-assemble the discrete with
the continuous, the finite with the infinite, the point with the line.
The diabolical
More generally, measurement harbors a profound anxiety about the ontological status of
continua (Serres 2017). For instance, the early calculus relied on the use of infinitesimals
- infinitely small continua - to accurately calculate various kinds of quantities in problems
and applications. These were named indivisibles because they were considered a kind of
fundamental element, without discrete parts, that could be infinitely distorted, inflated or
stretched. They had no ‘parts’ in the conventional sense of separable parts, but they
possessed a potential for differentiation, a sort of difference in itself. In other words, they
seemed to be changelings that could be used as discrete entities with definitive outlines,
and yet open to stretching and inflating as need be. Thus their very status seemed to
bridge the continuous and the discrete, object and relation. In some sense, they were both
and neither, and thus they perplexed those who argued for atomism and also those who
argued against it. Aristotle argued against the existence of these infinitesimal
‘indivisibles’; while, Archimedes deployed indivisibles in his computation of areas and
volumes in the second century BC.
Archimedes’ calculation techniques were taken up and further developed in the
1600s, during a period of intense mathematical invention in which infinitesimal
calculation flourished. And yet the very idea of a smallest interval that could not be
further dissected was indeed the source of many paradoxes. The infinitesimal of
Bonaventura Torricelli (1598-1647) and Evangelista Cavallieri (1608-1647) was
considered so radical that the Jesuits outlawed it in European education institutions.
In the 1630s, Jesuit fathers in Rome banned the doctrine of infinitesimals, in part
because of these paradoxes, declaring the idea to be dangerous and subversive, and
denouncing those who taught it. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) describe the infinitesimal as
always “diabolical” because it undermines the atomism and fixity of individuals, and
binds number and matter through infinite variation (p. 109).
Various definitions have emerged over the years – perhaps the simplest is that the
infinitesimal is an infinitely small interval. Leibniz (1646-1716) used the term
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infinitesimal to designate the distance between two numbers that are infinitely close
(Alexander 2014). This strange idea – that a continuous interval could be infinitely small
– runs counter to our intuitions about intervals as lengths that can always be divided into
yet smaller lengths. In what sense could an interval be infinitely small? Infinitesimals are
like continua “viewed in the small” as though one could zoom in and find the ultimate
miniscule straight lines that composed the macro surfaces that we typically encounter.
Others have described the infinitesimal as a quantity less than any finite quantity, a
quantity that operates beneath the finite world (de Freitas 2016a). Such quantities don’t
play by the usual rules, however, being so small that their squares and other powers can
be neglected. Perhaps the infinitesimal is an intensive magnitude rather than an extensive
magnitude, and as such partakes in the material world in quite different ways, weaving
the mathematical continuum together.
The paradoxical
A closer look at the seminal work of Cavalieri and Torricelli in the seventeenth century
sheds light on why there was so much concern. But it also shows how the mathematical
continuum, as source for the paradoxical, was pivotal in the development of the calculus.
In other words, the paradoxical was the driving force of invention. Torricelli, in
particular, created highly accessible treatises and offered “short, direct and positive
proofs” using infinitesimals (or indivisibles). Unlike Cavailieri, whose work was
burdened by attempts to avoid paradoxes, Toricelli delved into the paradoxes and put
them to work in a new kind of calculus. The mathematician and historian Amir
Alexander (2014) claims that Torricelli “reveled in paradoxes” (p.111) and tapped the
contradictions that emerged when one assumed the continuum was composed of
indivisibles, using them as tools for investigation (p.111). “The paradoxes were, in a way,
Torricelli’s mathematical experiments … For Torricelli, paradoxes … pushed logic to the
extreme, thereby revealing the true nature of the continuum, which cannot be accessed by
normal mathematical means” (Alexander 2014, p.112).
As a simple example, consider the task of calculating the area of a parallelogram
(Fig. 1). We divide the parallelogram into two equal triangles, and imagine the space of
the two triangles composed of lines with infinitesimal width (here shown as dotted lines),
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in one triangle they are vertical and the other horizontal. Following the methods of the
early calculus, these infinitesimal lines can be added up to determine the area of each
triangle (much like we might integrate under a curve by adding up the differential
rectangles).
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Fig. 1 Toricelli and paradox

But if we compare each infinitesimal line in one triangle with a corresponding
line in the other, we see that the vertical line will always be shorter than the horizontal. It
then follows, through pure logic, that since the vertical lines are always shorter than the
horizontal to which they are compared, the result obtained after adding them will always
be less. One triangle will have more area than the other! Contradiction! Cavalieri tried to
avoid such paradoxes by not allowing indivisibles to be compared that were not parallel.
But Torricelli would take up this simple paradox and delve into its potential for
rethinking the mathematical continuum. Indeed, the reciprocity in this example, how we
move back and forth between the vertical and the horizontal (lines of width dx and lines
of width dy), will be used to huge advantage.
Torricelli introduced an entirely different way of thinking about composition and
argued that there was a way that the longer lines could indeed add up to the shorter lines.
The significance of this for my argument is that he was willing to break with the ruling
doxa of the time, and did so by introducing a difference into a concept where there had
been none before. He quite simply contradicted Euclid’s definition of a line and claimed
that the short lines are wider than the long lines. In other words, lines are not all without
width, nor are they all of equal width (Alexander 2014). The idea that some lines were
wider than others was a revolutionary idea, and broke with conventional definitions of the
line. The same proposal was made for indivisible points that might inflate to varying
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sizes, and indivisible planes of varying thickness. It was as if Toricelli was carving out a
new virtual dimension for these geometric objects, which suddenly allowed them to
distort in convenient ways. Indivisibles were shown to possess a previously imperceptible
dimension, which was allowed infinite variation in magnitude, and thus an infinitary
calculus was born.
This controversial move allowed one to calculate various measures that had never
before been attempted, extending mathematics reach and relevance, and re-assembling
the relationship between mathematics and matter. If lines had infinitesimal width and
planes had infinitesimal thickness, then geometry engaged with matter in new ways.
These geometric concepts became physico-mathematical entities. Despite their awkward
ontological status, people began to use infinitesimals in their calculations, calling them
“linelets” and “timelets” and “evanescent quantities” and “inassignable quantities”.
Concerns over their ontological status, however, would eventually lead to a theory
of limits and an attempt to rid mathematics of actually infinite small quantities. Limit
theory would eventually rule the day. But there have always been advocates for
infinitesimals, and they continue to be of interest today. In the nineteenth century, for
instance, the mathematician Paul du Bois-Reymond (1831-1889) argued on their behalf,
stating, “The proposition that the number of points of division of the unit length is
infinitely large produces with logical necessity the belief in the infinitely small.” He
advocated for a geometric number line composed of points and infinitesimal intervals.
Charles Dodgson (1832-1898) and Charles Peirce (1839-1914) were also advocates for
the infinitesimal. For Peirce, a continuous line contained no points, only continuous
infinitesimal intervals. Wherever a point occurs, claimed Peirce, that point “interrupts the
continuity” (CP 6.168). For Peirce, infinitesimals could be used for measurement without
disrupting continuity. In other words, infinitesimals were measurements intrinsic to the
continuous entity, and thus they avoided the perennial concern that measures of the
continuous were always imposed from without (always the discrete fumbling to make
sense of the robust continuous). Accordingly, infinitesimals were a “continuitypreserving method of measurement” (Buckley 2012, p. 149). The infinitesimal was
finally given formal legitimacy (aside from its evident pragmatic value) in the 1960s
when the mathematician Abraham Robinson produced a powerful and coherent
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foundation for the hyperreal numbers, which incorporated infinitesimals, transfinite
numbers and the real numbers in one system (Bell 2013).
Abduction and indeterminacy
The marriage of the number line with the Real numbers brings hope and promise for an
ultimate kind of synergy where measure and matter partake together of an onto-logical
mixture. The continuum thus becomes a means of fusing connectives and quantifiers,
geometry and arithmetic, the finite and the infinite. The paradoxes that haunt the
continuum continue to be a driving force for new mathematical adventures today (Katz &
Tall 2011, Katz & Poley 2017). The mathematician Fernando Zalamea (2012)
demonstrates how contemporary developments in Category theory build on Peirce’s work
in the late nineteenth century on the mathematical continuum. Peirce merged modal logic
with mathematics in novel ways, introducing the notion of abduction as a pivotal form of
inference.2 Peirce considered abduction “the process of forming explanatory hypotheses.”
and claimed that “It is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea” (CP
5.172). According to Peirce, abduction is a crucial form of reasoning in mathematics, and
operates unlike induction and deduction, in that it involves systematic guessing. The
guess becomes a key act of reason, a full-fledged form of operating mathematically.
Abduction is precisely how we hypothesize about an odd irregular event, and thus
it plays a pivotal role in how we might respond to the weird number that refuses to obey
our axioms, or the anxiety when faced with the apparent gaps in the continuum. We can’t
use deduction or induction in such instances, but must employ a different form of
thinking. Abduction is at work when we devise means – as Dedekind did - of gluing the
continuum back together wherever a cleavage or cut or gap is discerned. Speculating – or
what Peirce would call guessing - is crucial in response to such tears in the fabric of life.
In other words, a certain “explanatory continuum” is achieved through abduction, as it
knits the torn threads of the mathematical continuum, darning the holes with speculation.
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An abduction is a process that one might say supplements induction and deduction in our
efforts to ‘explain’ the continuum.
More specifically, abduction is characterized as the act of composing a hypothesis
based on an observation of an irregularity that occurs in relation to expectations. This
might be characterized as a “vague” deformation of syllogistic deduction that allows one
to form a “retro-implicative inference” (Zalamea 2012, p.100). The table below, derived
from that of Zalamea (2012), shows how abduction differs from deduction and induction,
in terms of the kind of inference that is allowed:
Deduction
All X is Y
Some Z is X
Some Z is Y

Induction
Some Z is X
Some Z is Y
All X is Y

Abduction
All X is Y
Some Z is Y
Some Z is X

These examples help us discern the differences between different forms of
reasoning, underscoring the ambition and weakness of each. In the case of abduction, the
inference is deeply speculative, venturing to posit something that cannot be deduced or
induced. Vagueness is precisely what makes abduction so powerful - guessing introduces
possibilities of ‘errors’ but it also performs a kind of reasoning that cannot be achieved
otherwise. In deduction, we know there are members of Z that are definitively part of Y,
but in abduction we only know that members of Z may be part of a smaller set contained
within the set to which they belong. Maybe so, maybe not. Note how terribly easy it is to
go ‘wrong’ in abduction. The point here is that abduction plugs into our uncertainty – our
not knowing - in a very particular and productive way. We use abduction regularly on a
daily basis, whenever we form a hypothesis based on limited knowledge and generate a
plausible explanation. Abduction tries to explain systematically a break or a breach in
regularity or homogeneity or order, and is thus the very instrument needed when faced
with the irruptions and gaps of the ever illusive continuum.
Thus the deep task of abduction may be seen as locally gluing breaks in the
continuum, by means of an arsenal of methods which select effectively the “closer”
explanatory hypotheses for a given break and which try to “erase” discontinuities from a
new regularizing perspective:
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Fig. 2 Image from Zalamea, 2012, p. 102

Through the speculative act of abduction, we smudge the discontinuity and patch
together both the mathematical continuum but also the cosmological continuum of life
itself. Abduction, however, is not only a human faculty, but is an expression of a worldly
synechism and tychism – the terms that Peirce used to describe his metaphysics of
continuity and chance. For Peirce, continuity and chance are the two entangled
metaphysical attributes of the world. Through abduction, chance is leveraged to mend the
break in any continuum. Chance is a crucial term for Peirce, because it is through
probability and modal logic that he will pursue abduction more systematically. There is a
combinatorial logic in the act of guessing, a process of mapping the span of possibility, a
habit of listing all possible outcomes, and then ‘counting the chances’ of one outcome
occurring in the midst of that set of possibilities, more or less exactly. “What are the
odds?” we ask, of finding an irrational number in this set, and we begin to weave
hypotheses and stitch a covering of some kind, glimpsing and encountering provisionally
the virtual realm of minuscule differentiations – this, and/or this, and/or this, and/or this,
and/or this, and/or this, … in an iterative process that is at the heart of the concept of
algorithm. Abduction engages with what we don’t know, the essential not-knowing that
spurs on a speculative hypothesis – a “plausible explanation” – selected from the
differentiated sea of reason. This sea is so turbulent that we are made sea-sick, aghast at
the vanishing indivisibles that subtend the threshold of imperceptibility. As Zalamea
(2012) suggests, this realm is populated by an “infinitude of useless hypotheses” (p.102).
As the hallmark of our not-knowing, chance is the engine of a profound
ontological indeterminism. Chance haunts the continuum, interrupting its smoothness, but
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also mending and stitching over the gaps. Peirce’s proposal that abduction is the warp
and weave of the mathematical continuum gives the continuum hypothesis all its cosmic
and encyclopedic dimensions. Rather than concern ourselves with error and delusion, as
the cogito would have us do, the mathematical continuum demands that we make the
coupling of line and number a transcendental problem. Chance and continuity together
becomes a generative problematics – still haunting, diabolical and paradoxical – but
wisely at work for no purpose that we can fathom. As Deleuze (1990) suggests, the
interval is more than a naïve measure, more than a hasty line drawn in the sand, but
instead a gesture that affirms all of chance, a gesture that affirms indeterminacy as a
plenitude rather than a lack. This profound indeterminism haunts the mathematical
continuum like a hungry ghost.
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